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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAMAS VALLEY CO-OP and 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION. 
Plaintiffs/Petitioners, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE 
FUND. 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 900182-CA 
Priority No. 7 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND 
I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated. Sections 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
In June. 1984 employer/carrier, with ready access to all 
relevant medical data, prepared and submitted for agreement by (1) 
injured employee. L. B. Cornell, (2) Second Injury Fund (now 
Employers1 Reinsurance Fund). and (3) Industrial Commission a 
Compensation Agreement setting forth the allocation of compensation 
liability between the employer/carrier on the one hand and Second 
Injury Fund on the other. That agreement was approved for payment 
on June 22, 1984 (R. 18) and payments under the same were made by 
the employer/carrier and the Second Injury Fund. 
The sole issue in this controversy: 
Can the employer/carrier 5 (five) years later renege on 
that Compensation Agreement and assert as against the Second Injury 
Fund an entirely different percentage allocation of liability? 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
This case arose pursuant to Section 35-1-78 Utah Code 
Annotated which read as follows: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each 
case shall be continuing, and it may from time to time 
make such modification or change with respect to former 
findings, or Orders with respect thereto, as in its 
opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records 
pertaining to cases, other than those of total permanent 
disability or where a claim has been filed as in Section 
35-1-99, which have been closed and inactive for a period 
of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
Commission. 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include 
interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date when 
each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and 
payable. 
Plaintiff has asserted also that Utah Code Annotated 
Section 35-1-69, controls in the allocation of liability in this 
controversy. It is the position of Defendant Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund that 35-1-69 has no application in view of the Compensation 
Agreement referred to above as observed by all parties during the 5 
(five) years since the Agreement was executed by the parties and as 
approved and ordered by the Industrial Commission. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The basic pertinent facts in this controversy are not in 
serious dispute and essentially may be set forth as follows: 
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L.B. Cornell (hereinafter called "applicant") sustained an 
industrial accident while employed by Kamas Valley Co-Op 
(hereinafter called "Plaintiff") on January 30, 1984. 
According to applicant, he was on a short ladder helping 
to apply decals when "I slipped on the ladder rather 
violently and caught myself prior to hitting the ground, 
and immediately I had sharp pains into my hip and 
buttocks." (R. 43) 
Applicant, upon instructions from Plaintiff, went first to 
his chiropractor in the Kamas, Utah area but received no 
relief from his pains (R. 46). Applicant finally 
requested referral to a medical doctor at the Heber 
Hospital, where he was attended for some time by treating 
physician. Dr. N.J. Burton (R. 47 & 168). The record of 
treating physician. Dr. Burton shows continued care and 
examination from date of admission February 7. 1984 
through date of discharge February 21, 1984 (R. 168). 
That record obviously was at all times available to the 
Plaintiff employer, including several references in the 
one page Discharge Summary Report to applicant's prior 
history of peptic ulcer disease (R. 168). 
The same discharge report shows also the referral of 
applicant to Dr. Thoen in Salt Lake City for neurological 
consultation. 
The record shows applicant testified (R. 48, 49) of the 
visit to Dr. Thoen, the referral to Dr. Robert Lamb and 
finally the surgery performed on applicant's back by Dr. 
Lamb on February 24, 1984. 
Plaintiff employer accepted compensation liability from 
the beginning on this case and paid temporary total 
disability benefits from January 31, 1984 through June 12, 
1984. Plaintiff through its carrier (also called 
"plaintiff" hereafter) apparently reviewed its medical 
records on applicant and requested a permanent partial 
impairment rating from Dr. Lamb. Dr. Lamb's response, 
(attached hereto as Addendum 1), contained his overall 
evaluation - without any breakdown - of 35% permanent 
partial disability. 
Plaintiff carrier, on May 30, 1984, requested Dr. Lamb for 
a breakdown of the permanent partial impairment rating and 
received by letter dated June 13, 1984, Dr. Lamb's opinion 
that 50% of applicant's disability was due to his 
pre-existing injury. (Addendum 2) 
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Plaintiffs thereupon prepared a Compensation Agreement 
providing for allocation between Plaintiff and Defendant 
of 50% each for a permanent partial disability rating of 
35% and secured applicant's agreement to that Compensation 
Agreement. The Agreement was then presented to the Second 
Injury Fund which on June 22, 1984 approved the allocation 
of permanent partial disability to pre-existing conditions 
of 17.5% which was 1/2 of the permanent partial disability 
agreed upon. Since the Law requires and since the 
Compensation Agreement specifically provided "that this 
agreement becomes binding and effective only when it is 
approved by the Industrial Commission", the executed 
Compensation Agreement was presented for the approval of 
Industrial Commission which was obtained on June 22, 
1984. (A copy of that Compensation Agreement is attached 
as Defendant's Addendum 3). 
Pursuant to the approved Compensation Agreement, the then 
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund issued Order 
Requiring Payment from the Second Injury, which was passed 
by the Industrial Commission on June 29, 1984. That Order 
specifies payment by the Second Injury Fund of the 
pre-existing permanent partial impairment of 17.5% and 
further ordered reimbursement to plaintiff's of 50% 
Finally, that Order specifically provides as follows: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review 
of the foregoing shall be filed in writing within 
fifteen (15) days from the date hereof specifying 
in detail the particular errors and objections, 
and unless so filed this Order shall be final and 
not subject to review or appeal. (That Order is 
attached as Defendant's Addendum 4). 
In early 1988, applicant developed a reoccurrence of his 
back pain and discomfort (R. 55-58). According to his 
testimony, he got in touch with the Utah Industrial 
Commission who gave him permission to seek Arizona medical 
attention. He requested from the Industrial Commission a 
reinstatement of medical and other benefits. According to 
a letter from Plaintiff's Utah Counsel to the Industrial 
Commission dated November 28, 1988 (Defendant's Addendum 
5), Plaintiff carrier resumed benefits to applicant and 
sought medical reports by way of verification. According 
to Plaintiff's November 28, 1988 letter, there was some 
medical evidence indicating a new injury to applicant in 
January, 1988 which prompted Defendant carrier to deny 
liability for any reinstatement of benefits. Moreover, as 
late as November 28, 1988, Plaintiffs referred to the 
Compensation Agreement as requiring 50% contribution by 
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.the Second Injury Fund (defendant herein), thus indicating 
Plaintiffs continued intention to honor the provisions of 
the 1984 Compensation Agreement it had prepared and 
processed for approval and Order by the Industrial 
Commission. 
Pursuant to the Application for Hearing filed by the 
applicant, a hearing was held before the Administrative 
Law Judge on February 10, 1989. (R. 39) 
After the Hearing, Judge Allen referred the matter to a 
Medical Panel to determine whether or not applicant was 
entitled to additional permanent partial impairment 
compensation. 
The Medical Panel Report (R. 273) did not endeavor to 
disturb the allocation already found in the Compensation 
Agreement with respect to the 35% permanent partial 
impairment agreed upon by the parties other than to say 
that there had been no increase in that impairment since 
the original Agreement. 
Upon receiving the Medical Panel Report, Plaintiffs 
asserted, despite their prior Agreement as to allocation 
of responsibility, that the Medical Panel's finding of 10% 
impairment due to pre-existing peptic ulcer must be 
included in the apportionment formula. This assertion was 
made despite the fact that full knowledge of the peptic 
ulcer was available to the Plaintiffs prior to Plaintiff's 
preparation and processing - for Industrial Commission 
approval and Order - of the June 22, 1984 Compensation 
Agreement (R. 168 - See Dr. Burton's early reports 
following referral of applicant for treatment and 
subsequent surgery). 
Defendant Employers' Reinsurance Fund filed its response 
to the claim of Plaintiffs for Amendment to the previously 
agreed reapportionment allocation in the Compensation 
Agreement (Defendant's Addendum 6). 
On October 3, 1989, Judge Allen issued his Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in which he found that 
the applicant was not entitled to additional permanent 
partial impairment and therefore, that there was no basis 
for changing the reapportionment set forth in the earlier 
Compensation Agreement (Addendum 7). 
Applicant did not file a Motion for Review of Judge 
Allen's Order of October 3, 1989 and, thus was precluded 
from asserting any claim for additional permanent partial 
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impairment. However, on October 11, 1989, Plaintiff filed 
its Motion for Review asserting that it was entitled to a 
reallocation of the apportionment of liability because of 
the Medical Panel's findings (R. 294). 
The matter was considered by the full Commission and on 
March 5, 1990, the Commission's Order Denying Motion for 
Review was issued (R. 303). On April 3, 1990, Plaintiffs 
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review of 
the Industrial Commission March 5, 1990 Order (R. 306, 
309). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the position of defendant Second Injury Fund as 
There is no legal basis for any award of permanent partial 
disability benefits to the applicant. The Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Administrative 
Law Judge dated October 3, 1989 held that applicant was 
not entitled to any further benefits as the result of his 
industrial accident of January 30, 1984 (Defendant 
Addendum 7). As usual, that Order specified that "any 
Motion for Review of the foregoing shall be filed in 
writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, . . 
and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal." No appeal was taken by 
applicant to that Order. In addition, the Order Denying 
Motion for Review which was filed by Plaintiffs Kamas 
Valley Co-Op and/or National Farmers Union, sustained the 
Order of the Administrative Law Judge on March 5, 1990. 
Applicant did not appeal that Order; therefore, for that 
additional legal reason this Court has no jurisdiction to 
change the Order of the Administrative Law Judge denying 
any additional benefits to the applicant. (See Retherford 
v. Industrial Commission, 739 P.2d 76, 80 (Utah App. 
1987); see also Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 
602, 603 (Utah App. 1987). 
There is no legal basis, in law or in equity, which will 
support Plaintiffs renunciation of the June, 1984 
Compensation Agreement prepared and processed by 
Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs demands that the said 
Compensation Agreement be amended with five (5) years 
rectroactivity to provide an entirely different allocation 
of liability between Plaintiffs and Defendant Second 
Injury Fund. 
6 
VI. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPLICANT'S FAILURE TO APPEAL EITHER THE ORDER OF THE 
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE OR THE FULL COMMISSION'S ORDER 
DENYING BENEFITS LEFT THIS COURT WITH NO JURISDICTION TO 
REVERSE THE DENIAL OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS TO APPLICANT IN 
THIS CASE. 
As indicated above, applicant properly sought 
consideration by the Commission by virtue of the provisions of 
Sections 35-1-78 Utah Code Annotated, which permits such a reopening 
where the applicant believes his prior award to be inadequate due to 
changes in his condition. See Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 681 
P.2d 144 (Utah 1984), (Defendant's Addendum 8). However, following 
a Hearing, the submission of additional evidence, and referral to a 
Kedical Panel, the Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying any additional benefits 
to the applicant (Addendum 7). Applicant did not file a Motion for 
Review to the Order of the Administrative Law Judge. In addition, 
following a Motion for Review by Plaintiffs, the full Commission 
issued its Order Denying Motion for Review wherein the Order of the 
\dministrative Law Judge denying benefits to applicant was 
affirmed. Again, applicant failed to file any appeal to the Order 
3f the Industrial Commission within the period prescribed by 
statute. Accordingly, pursuant to well established Utah 
\dministrative and Workers1 Compensation Law, the Court of Appeals 
las no jurisdiction to review the Orders issued by the 
\dministrative Law Judge and the full Industrial Commission, 
respectively, denying additional benefits to the applicant in his 
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claim for benefits arising out of his 1984 industrial injury. 
POINT II 
AS BETWEEN THIS DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF EMPLOYER. THIS 
CASE INVOLVES A COMBINATION OF TWO WELL RECOGNIZED LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES: 
1. The principle of Res Judicata, and 
2. The binding effect of a legal agreement such as 
the Compensation Agreement entered into between 
Plaintiff and Defendant in this case and 
approved along with Order passed by the 
Industrial Commission. 
(1) Res Judicata. It is established law in Utah and 
elsewhere that the principle of Res Judicata applies to Workers1 
Compensation as well as other areas of Utah Law. As this Court 
stated in Memorandum Decision Case Number 890675-CA, Merrill J. 
Bailey v. Industrial Commission of Utah: (Attached as Addendum 9) 
The doctrine of Res Judicata is available in Workers1 
Compensation matters. See Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
Law, Section 79.72 (1989). 
This doctrine has also been recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court in cases such as Buxton v. Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d 
121, 123 (Utah 1978); see also Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 733 
P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1987). Professor Larson in his treatise, supra, 
states that the normal rule of Res Judicata, which requires identity 
or privity between the parties to the proceeding producing the 
decision relied on and the parties in the proceeding in which it is 
invoked applies to compensation-related application of the 
doctrine. He states further that the "classical Res Judicata 
doctrine requires identity not only of parties but of issues, and 
this requirement is generally respected in cases involving Workmen's 
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Compensation." In this controversy, there was, of course, total 
privity and identity between and among all the parties including the 
applicant, the employer/carrier and the Second Injury Fund. 
Moreover, there was identity of issues i.e., the percentage of 
permanent partial disability to be awarded to the applicant and the 
allocation of liability as between the employer (Plaintiff herein) 
and the Second Injury Fund (Defendant herein). 
Defendant is aware and as this Court said in the Merrill 
Bailey case, supra, that: 
Application of Res Judicata must, however, be 
harmonized with the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Industrial Commission in Workers1 Compensation to 
reopen cases and modify awards And 
further: The Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
interpreted the foregoing language to require "as the 
basis of modification, evidence of some significant 
change or new development in the claimant's injury or 
proof of the previous award's inadequacy." (Citing 
Buxton and Spencer cases, supra). 
It should be pointed out that in all of the Utah cases 
cited and/or referred to where Res Judicata was held not to apply 
and reopening was permitted under the Provisions of 35-1-78, it was 
the applicant, who was the principal party involved in the alleged 
changes of condition or changes in disability which made the 
original Order or settlement, as the case may be, inadequate. In 
this case, applicant believed his back condition to have worsened 
since the 1984 Compensation Agreement and, thus was permitted to 
file for additional benefits. However, the Medical Panel as well as 
the Administrative Law Judge found that applicant had been 
adequately compensated for his back condition and, thus was not 
entitled to any further permanent partial disability award. As 
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mentioned above, applicant did not appeal either the Decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge or the Order of the full Commission with 
respect to the denial of additional compensation benefits to him. 
Therefore, the Order as to applicant is final and the reasons for 
permitting reopening by the applicant in the various other cases 
mentioned and cited have been removed. What we have left is a 
Compensation Agreement entered into at arm's length by the 
employer/carrier on the one hand and the Second Injury Fund on the 
other with respect to the allocation of responsibility for not only 
compensation but medical expenses. Plaintiff prepared the 
Compensation Agreement setting forth the allocation of 
responsibility; Plaintiff had all of the available medical records 
either in his possession or at his disposal. As mentioned before, 
the Discharge Summary of N. J. Burton, M.D. (R. 168) (Addendum 10), 
mentions not only in the provisional diagnosis section but in the 
final diagnosis section the "prior history of peptic ulcer disease" 
along with the basic questions with respect to applicant's 
lumbosacral problems. In addition, the peptic ulcer history is set 
forth in the paragraph entitled Course in Hospital with 
Complications, if any because of its influence upon the medication 
to be given to applicant. Thus, it is readily apparent that 
Plaintiffs either knew or certainly are charged with knowledge of 
applicant's peptic ulcer disease history which later was referred to 
in the 1989 Medical Panel Report as perhaps being responsible for an 
additional 10% permanent partial impairment. 
For whatever reasons Plaintiffs may have had, the 
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Compensation Agreement was prepared and submitted for the approval 
of Defendant Second Injury Fund, showing a 50-50 split of 
responsibility for a 35% permanent partial disability rating for the 
applicant. This was done within six months following the accident 
and at the time when Plaintiffs had all the information necessary to 
make their own determination as to what percentage allocation they 
wished to submit to the Second Injury Fund. Plaintiffs may have 
overlooked the possibility of additional pre-existing impairment as 
the result of the information pertaining to the peptic ulcer passed 
difficulties of applicant; it may well be that in 1984, no rating 
was accorded to such peptic ulcer history. In any event, the 
Agreement was submitted to Defendants with applicant's signature and 
Plaintiffs' representative's signature. The then Administrator of 
the Second Injury Fund, for reasons of his own, may have considered 
the allocation satisfactory from his standpoint and, therefore, 
attached his approval to the Compensation Agreement. The Industrial 
Commission approved the Agreement on June 22, 1984, after which an 
Order was issued by the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund 
(Addendum 7), which Order by its specific language shows that it was 
"passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah". 
In summary, it is the position of Defendant Second Injury 
Fund that as between Defendants and Plaintiffs herein all of the 
requirements of the doctrine of Res Judicata have been met and 
indeed were existing at the time Plaintiffs attempted to amend the 
Commission's Order and to recalculate the allocation of liability as 
between Plaintiffs and Defendant. Under the rationale of the 
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Merrill Bailey Decision, supra, as well as that found in the Supreme 
Court Decisions in Buxton and Spencer, supra, the Res Judicata 
doctrine clearly should be applied in this case and Plaintiffs 
should not be permitted to rescind or revise some five (5) years 
following approval by all parties and approval and Order by the 
Industrial Commission of the Compensation Agreement which was 
prepared by Plaintiffs. Some reference has been made to the Supreme 
Court Decision in Alvin G. Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1984), in which applicant was permitted to reopen and 
both applicant and the employer/carrier were given the benefit of 
newly discovered pre-existing back conditions previously unknown to 
any of the parties involved as well as an additional pre-existing 
neurological impairment, also previously unknown to the parties. 
Clearly those salient features make the Rhodes Decision inapplicable 
to the issue between Plaintiffs and Defendant in this case, wherein 
Plaintiffs who prepared the Compensation Agreement were fully aware 
of the applicant's peptic ulcer history which history was the same 
as that later considered by the 1989 Medical Panel. To emphasize 
the difference between the Rhodes case and the instant controversy 
the following is found in the Opinion of the Supreme Court in the 
Rhodes case (681 P.2d 1244 at 1248): 
In the instant case, Mr. Rhodes' pre-existing back 
condition was latent and did not manifest itself 
until the Settlement. The record indicates that none 
of the settling parties knew of the prior condition. 
. . . (See Addendum 8) 
Clearly in this case, applicant's peptic ulcer condition 
was not latent and it was apparent in all of the Medical Reports 
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particularly, the Discharge Summary after applicant's initial 
hospitalization following his injury of January, 1984. Defendant 
believes, therefore, that as between Plaintiffs and Defendant in 
this case, the doctrine of Res Judicata applies to the allocation of 
liability set forth in the Compensation Agreement approved and later 
passed as an Order by the Industrial Commission. 
(2) As between Plaintiffs and Defendant, the Compensation 
Agreement of June 22, 1984 constitutes a binding contract as to the 
allocation of all compensation liability existing at that time. 
In addition to the issue of Res Judicata, this controversy 
involves the very simple contract issue of the continued observance 
by Plaintiff as well as Defendant of the provisions of an Agreement 
entered into more than five (5) years before, i.e., the June 22, 
1984 Compensation Agreement. That Agreement was prepared by 
Plaintiff who had access to all the relevant medical information 
! 
necessary for its preparation, including not only the relevant 
information necessary for applicant's back evaluation and allocation 
but also the information clearly setting forth the existence of a 
[ 
prior peptic ulcer history on the part of applicant. (See R. 168 -
copy attached hereto as Defendant's Addendum 10). That Compensation 
Agreement clearly was intended to set forth the allocation of 
compensation liability between Plaintiff and Defendant for all of 
applicant's pre-existing as well as industrial disability as of that 
date. Defendant agreed with the proposed allocation made by 
Plaintiff and the executed Agreement was submitted to and received 
the approval of the Industrial Commission. Indeed, it was later 
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reduced to Order passed by the Commission insofar as the allocation 
of responsibility was concerned. The Agreement was observed by both 
Plaintiff and Defendant in making the required payments. The record 
shows that as late as November 28, 1988, Plaintiffs referred to the 
Compensation Agreement by letter to the Industrial Commission as 
requiring 50% contribution by Defendant Second Injury Fund (see 
Addendum 5). Finally, it should be pointed out that the ultimate 
outcome as well as the final determination of the case was that 
there had been no increase in the impairment or disability of the 
applicant since the date of the June 22, 1984 Compensation 
Agreement. Under such circumstances. Defendant strongly believes 
that Plaintiffs1 attempt to reallocate liability between Plaintiff 
and Defendant at this late date is improper, if not unconscionable. 
That the Law generally encourages settlements is 
recognized in Utah as well as throughout the country. (See Rhodes 
v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d at 1248). Obviously, this 
applies in Workers1 Compensation settlements, particularly whereas 
in Utah there is a special provision which requires Industrial 
Commission's approval of any such Settlement Agreement. (See Utah 
Code Annotated 35-1-62). Obviously, as held in the Rhodes case, 
once Commission's approval is obtained such a Settlement Agreement 
assumes the same statute as a Commission award. See also Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Section 82.60 where it is stated: 
If the Settlement is approved, it takes on the 
quality of an award, and the parties can no more back 
out of it than out of any other kind of award. 
Such language is particularly applicable as between an 
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employer (Plaintiff herein) and the Second Injury Fund (Defendant 
herein), where the liability allocation is specifically agreed upon 
in view of the medical data existing at that time and available in 
this case to the employer/plaintiff. It has been determined in this 
case that there has been no change of conditions with respect to the 
permanent partial disability of the applicant since the date of the 
injury and the date of the original Compensation Agreement of June 
22, 1984. Thus, we do not have in this controversy the change of 
conditions which have formed the basis for the reopening of 
Commission awards in all of the prior cases referred to by the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. In addition, we do not have 
in this case the principal item referred to in the reopening of the 
Rhodes case, i.e., a pre-existing condition that was completely 
unknown to all of the parties at the time the original Settlement 
was executed. In the Rhodes case, half of the applicant's 20% 
permanent partial back impairment was a pre-existing condition which 
was latent and "did not manifest itself until after the 
Settlement". In this case, it is clear from the medical records 
(see Addendum 10 from applicant's treating physician) that was 
applicant's pre-existing back history available to Plaintiff but 
also his pre-existing peptic ulcer history. Thus, Plaintiff had all 
the necessary information for the preparation of the Compensation 
Agreement which he submitted for applicant's approval and then for 
the approval of Defendant Second Injury Fund. As mentioned before, 
the Agreement was approved after review by the Defendant and 
forwarded to the Industrial Commission for its final approval. It 
15 
has already been determined that there were no conditions which were 
changed or which increased Plaintiff's permanent impairment after 
his industrial injury or after the execution of the Compensation 
Agreement. Accordingly, there is no legal basis and there is no 
basis in justice to permit Plaintiff to reopen the case five (5) 
years later and attempt to alter the reapportionment formula which 
it presented to all the other parties and the Industrial Commission 
for approval. Plaintiffs should be bound by the terms of his 
contract either by virtue of Res Judicata or by means of observance 
of simple but uniform rules of contract law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have attempted to utilize the continuing 
Commission jurisdiction provisions of Section 35-1-78 Utah Code 
Annotated as a means of avoiding the terms of a contract 
(Compensation Agreement) prepared by Plaintiff and submitted to all 
parties, including the Defendant and the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, for approval and execution five (5) years before. A final 
determination has been made that there has been no change in 
conditions since the execution of that Compensation Agreement on 
June 22, 1984; there has been no mutual mistake of fact which under 
ordinary contract principles conceivably would call for recision or 
revision of that contract. That contract was approved by the 
Industrial Commission of Utah and subsequently became an Order of 
the Commission. (Addendum 4). It is the position of Defendant that 
Plaintiff is bound by the provisions of that contract by the well 
established 
16 
legal principle of Res Judicata as well as by application of simple 
but well established rules of contract law. Plaintiff1s Petition to 
this Court, therefore, should be dismissed and the Decision of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed. i 
Respectfully submitted this _<? day of November, 1990 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Employers1 Reinsurance Fund 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
Defendant's Brief were mailed this day of November, 1990. to 
the following: 
Henry K. Chai II. Esq. 
SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P. O. Bo# 45000 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P. O. Botf 510250 
Salt Lake City. UT 84151-0250 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By. 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
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ROBERT K LAMB, MXX 
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGERY 
ST MARK S OFFICE BUILDING 4A 
1220 EAST 3900 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84124 
TELEPHONE (801) 262-6486 
May 24, 1984 
National Farmers Union Life 
300 South 564 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 
RE: L.B. Cornell 
Gentlemen; 
I think that the fusion which Mr. Cornell had in 1968 predisposed 
the early wear and tear of the disc space above the fusion. He also 
had a pseudoarthrosis of the L4-5 disc space which was decompressed 
during his recent surgery in February. 
This patient has a 35% permanent partial disability of the man as a 
whole. 
If I can furnish any further information regarding this patient, please 
let me knowf 
Sincerely yours, 
Robert H. Lamb, M.D, 
RHL:lc 
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ROBERT H. LAMB, M.O. 
ORTHOPA60IC SUf lGEHr 
ST MARK S OFFICE 8UU.OING, 4A 
1220 6AST 3900 SOUTH 
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H 8 4 1 2 4 
TELEPHON6 (801) 262-8466 
June 13, 1984 
Mr. Robert S. Jackson 
National Farmers Union Life 
300 South 564 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
RE: L, B, Cornell 
Dear Mr. Jackson: 
We are in receipt o f your l e t t e r of May 30, 1984 regarding Mr. 
Corne l l . You asked for a ra t ing percentage assessed to the pre-
ex i s t i ng i n ju ry . I feel that 50% of his d i s a b i l i t y is due to 
his pre-ex is t ing i n j u r y . 
I f I can be of fur ther help, please l e t me know. 
Sincerely yours, 
Robert H. Lamb, M.D. 
RHL:lc s<\) c,*!c 
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V I 7 \ » W ^ « »w»%»» 
B_KON_ THIS INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION Of UTAH 
L I . CORNELL 
(Applicant* 
KAHAS VALLEY COOP 
(Kaployor) 
NATIONAL FARHCTS UNION INS. 
( Insurance Carr ior) 
Oofofwiont 
Com^asATtuN 
ACIIICKflMfT 
_M»QKA_. **• ** CQWNCLL _____in«d 4 pwr_«m*«l injury by 
acsidont arising out of or m tho cuurvo of hio m»p layout on that 30th day of 
J_ai__*_.* i * J _ whilo o-ployod by )UN__ Yallgy CtfUB 
which accidont has boon July reportod ta tha tttduutriai Cooonssion of tho Stata of 
Utah. According to thu phytic ion'* reports and agreoaont botwoon tha parties horo-
t o , said Applicant _us.tainod, as 4 rooult ol :;aid occidont« t««porary total i n -
ab i l i t y and/or pomauotit partial d i sab i l i ty , aa wi l l as incurring nodical and/ar 
hospital osponsot:. as horoinaftor sot forth: 
1-31-84 Tuaporary total disability ff 
payable at tho rate of 1 300.00 oor w««k tor a total of I 3.700.00 
* • 6-12-** 
has boon incurrod and tho carrier/*** loyor ha* paid a total of *J___L_flL 
of which tho following amount was taswd: I -O- M . 
2. 'Permanent partial -Inability bwuvd on S4.fi 
1200.00 por wuvk beginning ft-13-84 
and t Q hoe boon OUW.UKUU thwntutto of which t 
tamed 
weeks payable at tho rata of 
tor a total of t 10.o?n,nn . 
fl was 
follows: 
Said permanent partial d i sabi l i ty consists of tho *pecific loss as 
17 jw aorcaor poxa •I. diooblity— duo to- book—la 
17.32 are—»iaglng dt__hLlt_v 
3. locapitulation of compensation bone*its paid in connection with this claim: 
(at Nodical* Hospital and ftiscnllaneou* iiw-ut red J 10,602.20 
Pud lu date « l 2 l M L _ _ _ Z 
Valance (it any* -too I 
(b) Total W*«>kly Compensation (hmnfitu due 116.820.00 
raid to data t 5,700*00 
OaUiKu ( it .uiy) duo t 10,920.00 
(c) Total Nodical and Compenuat ion duo fn.T this Co«p«*nuat ion ' 
Agrevmont: % 10,920.00 
NUW TIIKKthOWK. in cons iderat ion of tlw |*_yMuiit ot the imounts ;t tU-U in 
Section J abovo u_ provided by law- tho Applt«:.utt hurcby acrupts tho cu<»p«ti*,ji urn 
and Nodical paymonl:: |*aid to data uul agrees wttlt tho p«ii*n»m«Mt partial disability 
rating shown above However, ttio Industrial Commission ot Utah .holt retain 
continuing jurisdiction to modify awards .is provided by law. Nodical *>4p«*ti_cc 
incurred as tho result of thtt industrial acenhftt aro Ut_ continuing obligation <»t 
tho insurance cai rier or employer. 
It is und«;rt*to«Mi that this agr*«*w»*tt becomus binding and effective only wh^n 
it is approved by tho Industrial COMMITS ion. 
Appt'ootnl I hi 
V% Si 
tAvey NATIONAL FAJtMOtS UNION I N S . / CAMAS VALLEY ;ir.i«.«CwrY ol lii^ui^iici* Cari'iwr/KnployvrCOOf 
H f
^ - - / -
Claisis Manage 
• _uon.»rt itir. •dir.tT. _onlfnct* »»t fw»<-Oj.>Q«*ni J».M*t \.%\ ttiuatM 1 i t / .out t aceooiPMny th in 
••Afrt.lCANT UlHlUtJI t*tt>. THAT cnjm»KNSATI«NI l_ TAt WATT \+* U>.CTIUN *314 (AM/} 0* 
StCTIO- »b, UHlThll STATKS COU<. 
O r i g . w i l l bo nMonwnl t o rat-ri«-r/«^o»luy^r -wol -.»gm-d cupy to uwploy«-o. 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. NA 
L. B. CORNELL, 
vs. 
Applicant, 
KAMAS VALLEY COOP and/or 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INS. 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER REQUIRING PAYMENT 
FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND 
APPROVED FOR PAYMENT 
SECOND ifcJURY/^NO^ 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
WHEREAS, on or about June 22, 1984, the applicant in the above-entitled 
matter, L. B. Cornell, caused a Compensation Agreement to be filed with the 
Industrial Commission and the same indicated that the Second Injury Fund might 
be responsible for permanent partial disability benefits, and 
WHEREAS, the carrier has paid temporary total compensation and medical 
expenses on behalf of the applicant for an industrial accident sustained on 
January 30, 1984, and 
WHEREAS, the applicant has sustained a 351 permanent partial impairment 
of the whole body with 17.51 due to the aggravation of a pre-existing 
condition which is the responsibility of the Second Injury Fund, and 
WHEREAS, the Administrator of the Second Injury Fund has reviewed the 
file, and pursuant to Section 35-1-68 (1) (a), the applicant is entitled to 
compensation for a 17.51 pre-existing impairment, and further the carrier 
shall be liable for any percentage of permanent physical impairment 
attributable directly to the industrial injury only. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Second Injury Fund prepare the 
necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as custodian of the Second 
Injury Fund, to pay to L. B. Cornell compensation at the rate of $200.00 per 
week, for 54.6 weeks or a total of $10,920.00, as compensation for a 17.51 
permanent partial impairment attributable to pre-existing conditions, said 
benefits to be paid commencing July 5, 1984. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that reimbursement shall be based upon a 17.5/35 
or 501 apportionment. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall 
be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof specifying in 
detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so filed this Order 
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Gilbert4 A. Martinez, /'Administrator 
Second Injury Fund V 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
c^T^day of June, 1984. 
ATTEST: 
Linda J. Str^sbtfrg 
Commission /Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on -g» Qj,As £- » 19 84 
a copy of the attached ORDER ^ 
was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
L. B. Cornell, 5328 East Taylor, Phoenix, AZ 85008 
National Farmers Union Life, 300 South 564 East, SLC, UT 84102 
Industrial Commission 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Madelyn 
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LAW OFFICES 
THUPMAM, vcfjwroo 4 irvtNr , 19O6 
IPAiNC, LAtZM i TS um AN ' 1923 
SKCCN. THuPMAM, *OPSL*f « »Nd* ' I9S2 
WOPSLCT SNOW * C*«tSTCN«CN I9«7 
November 28, 1988 or COUNSCU 
joscrn rov,«x 
GCO^Q* N. uAe.scN 
SNOW, C H H I S T E N S E N & MAHTINEAXJ 
ftCCO L. MAOT1MCAU HCNPY A. CMAI <l THUPMAN A SUTHCPtANO 
STUAirr u POCLMAN SPYCC 0. PANZXP , 0 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR
 # , THUPMAH, *uTnrPtANO« KINO 
PAYMONO M. BCPPY JOOY * •UPNCTT POST OFFICE BOX 4SOOO 
M. jAMCS CAXGC STANLEY K. STOU. _ _ - - . . _ 
M m N p. L Y M C P T OAvo J. CASTLCTON S A L T LAKE CITY, U T A H SAIAS 
OAViO w, SLAOLC PAMCiA G. MCTCftNAM T C L C P H O N C (801 ) 5 2 1 - 9 0 0 0 
A, OCNNIS NORTON OAVIO V* StAUGHTCP T C L C C O ^ C H ( S O U 3 6 3 - 0 * 0 0 
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MM P. WILSON P. SCOTT HOWCLU 
MtCMACL P. CAPCSTON SHAWN C OPANCY 
GCOPOC A. MONT JCPPY O. "CNN 
CkUOTT J . WIUiAMS CPAlO U BAPlOW 
OAVIO 0 , VWUUAMS JOHN P. LUNO 
wot c MAOSCN P V A * c. n a s i r r s 
MAX O. WMCCLCM ANMC SWCNSCN WWlTCP'S OlPCCT NUMSCP 
PAUL J . OPAT AMONeW M MOPSC 
PAUL C 0 * Q 2 PICHAPO A. VAH WAGONCft 
H1CNACL O. St-ACKSUPN OAVIO W. STCFFCNSCN 322*™9133 
POSCWT M. MCNOCASON LAPPY P. LAYCOC* 
STCPNCN POTH POSCPY C KCLLXP 
OCNNIS C. r tPGUSON CUZASCTH KING 8PCNNAN 
OAMIAN C. SMITH OANICL 0 . HIU. 
STCPHCN J . HIU. SAPSAPA J . OlCKCY 
• P U C C H. JCNSCM JOHN U WO00 
Barbara Elicerio 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Re: L.B. Cornell 
Inj: 01/30/84 
Emp: Kamas Valley Co-op 
Dear Ms. Elicerio: 
We represent the employer and its insurance carrier in 
this matter. 
Defendants admit that the Applicant sustained an indus-
trial accident on January 30, 1984. Benefits were paid pur-
suant to a Compensation Agreement approved by the Industrial 
Commission on June 22, 1984. 
In 1988 Applicant requested a reinstatement of benefits. 
Defendants conditionally began paying benefits on January 31, 
1988. Since Mr. Cornell was living in Arizona, he selected 
Dr. David A. Rand to provide his examination. On September 
15, 1988, Dr. Rand concluded that the present symptoms of 
Mr. Cornell are not related to the industrial accident, but 
rather to a new injury occurring in January, 1988. Based upon 
Dr. Rand's opinion, benefits were terminated in September, 1988. 
Because these benefits were paid for a period related to a new 
injury and not to the original industrial accident, Defendants 
are entitled to an offset of the 1988 payments against any 
further benefits that may be awarded. 
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Defendants deny all allegations not specifically aclmitted, 
Since 50% of the Applicant's back impairment is related to 
pre-existing conditions, the Employer's Reinsurance Fund should 
be joined as a Defendant. 
Before this matter is scheduled for a hearing, the Applicant 
should be required to submit medical evidence connecting his 
recent problems with the industrial accident. As already men-
tioned , Applicant's last treating physician did not relate his 
problem to the industrial injury. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTEN SEN & MARTINEAU 
HKC:aw 
cc: L.B. Cornell 
Sandra Southern 
Erie V. Boorman 
Henry K^CJrai 
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Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
State of Utah 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P 0 Box 510910 
Salt Lake Oty. Utah 84151-0910 
(801)530-6880 
ToN Ft99 1-800-426-0667 
FAX 801-530-6804 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Thomaa R. Carlson 
CommiMionvr 
Dixie L. Minson 
ComnuMioner 
November 6, 1989 
Timothy C. Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P. 0. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Re: L. B. Cornell 
Inj: 1/30/84 
Emp: Kamas Valley Co-op 
Dear Judge Allen: 
I have reviewed your October 3, 1989 Order in the above-entitled 
matter. I have also reviewed Mr. Chai's letter moving for the review of your 
Order and his request for an Amended Order. I note also that the applicant 
has made no motion for additional impairment in opposition to your Order of 
Denial and therefore, any application for increased benefits to the applicant 
appropriately is foreclosed as of this day. The same rationale, of course, 
applies to the suggestion by Mr. Chai that applicant appropriately is entitled 
at this stage for additional pre-existing impairment. 
With respect to the remainder of Hr. Chai's request as to a 
reallocation of compensation liability as well as reimbursement liability, I 
know of no authority which will permit the employer/carrier responsible for 
the original Compensation Agreement to recant on that agreement on the basis 
of a medical opinion issued more than five and a half (5 1/2) years after the 
injury and more than five (5) years after the execution of the Compensation 
Agreement. It appears clear from the correspondence from the carrier* s 
representative to Dr. Robert H. Lamb, that every effort was made to get a 
complete allocation insofar as pre-existing condition was made and that the 
Compensation Agreement was then prepared by the carrier, incorporating its own 
conclusions as to the appropriate liability of the employer/carrier on the one 
hand and the then Second Injury Fund on the other hand. Under such 
circumstances, it is unconscionable at this time for the carrier now to 
retrace its steps and attempt to get an entirely new evaluation and allocation 
of responsibility. 
In addition to the above position, it should be pointed out that the 
so called hearing loss referred to as being a pre-existing condition in fact 
was experienced within a short time of the examination made in 1989. 
Accordingly, that loss would not qualify under any circumstances as 
pre-existing the 1984 industrial injury. 
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Judge Allen 
November 3, 1989 
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In conclusion, it is the position of the Employers9 Reinsurance Fund 
that the employer/carrier is bound by the Compensation Agreement which it 
prepared and processed for execution by all parties, including the applicant 
and the then Second Injury Fund, and for ultimate Order by the Industrial 
Commission dated June 29, 1984, insofar as it applies to the compensation and 
reimbursement rights and benefits of the parties hereto and that the 
employer/carrier properly cannot attempt to revise those figures on basis of a 
1989 Medical Panel examination. Therefore, we respectfully submit that your 
Order of October 3, 1989 should remain unmodified as it was issued. 
EVB/tn 
cc: Henry K. Chai, Atty., P. 0. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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L.B. CORNELL, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
KAHAS VALLEY CO-OP and/or 
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 
Defendants. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 88000896 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
FUTOIHGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW^v-
AND ORDER 7 ^ 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * /#f 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334f Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 10, 
1989 at 8;30 a.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
L. B. Cornell, PRO SE. 
The defendants were represented by Henry K. Chai, 
Attorney at Law. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the matter was taken 
under advisement and referred to a medical panel by the Administrative Law 
Judge. The medical panel report was received and copies were distributed to 
the parties. Fifteen (15) days having elapsed since the mailing of said 
medical panel report, and no objections having been received thereto, the 
medical panel report is admitted into evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
In October of 1980, the applicant was hired by the Xamas Valley Co-op 
as its general manager. The co-op is owned by farmers in the Kamas Valley 
area and is Intended to provide livestock feed and other services to its 
members• 
On January 30, 1984, the applicant was helping prepare a field 
delivery truck, and towards that end was applying decals to the truck. He was 
using a 4f step ladder, and was applying a decal on the side of the truck, 
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when the ladder slipped and he started to fall. Hr. Cornell was able to avoid 
falling to the ground by grabbing hold of a railing on the truck. As he did 
so, he had an immediate sharp pain in his right hip and buttocks, which 
radiated across his back and down his right leg to his foot. The applicant 
testified that ha thought he had dislocated something. The following day he 
reported to Dr. Kelly Jarvis in Heber City for chiropractic treatment. The 
chiropractor performed an x-ray and daily chiropractic manipulation upon the 
applicant for the next week. The applicant testified that following each 
adjustment, his condition worsened. Following the seventh treatment, the 
applicant could hardly walk, so Dv. Jarvis drove him to the Wasatch County 
Hospital on February 7, 1984. At that time, the applicant was seen by Dr. 
Burton, general practitioner, who prescribed physical therapy and Feldene. 
The applicant testified that each time following a physical therapy session in 
the hospital, he had to be wheeled back to his room. He continued this course 
of treatment until February 21, 1984, when he was discharged from the 
hospital. On February 22, 1984, he was admitted to the St. Mark's Hospital 
and the following day received a CT scan and on February 24, received a 
laminectomy at L3-4. The applicant was also informed that there was psuedo 
arthrosis at L4-S by Dr. Lamb. Following the surgery, the applicant was 
eventually released by Dr. Lamb on June 12, 1984, to return to work. 
Since the applicants position was a working position, he did not 
return to that employment. Rather, he moved to Oklahoma and started selling 
land. On January 22, 1985, he was having some tightness in his back, so he 
reported to Dr. Butler in Oklahoma City. The doctor referred the applicant 
for physical therapy and the applicant reports that his condition improved as 
a result of that treatment. He continued selling land in Oklahoma until the 
oil market bust of approximately July or August of 1987. The applicant 
returned to Arizona in January of 1988. 
In the course of moving to Oklahoma to Northern Arizona, the 
applicant noticed that the long drive started to bother his back. He noticed 
that each time he would leave his car, he would have more and more difficulty 
straightening up. By the time he reached Arizona, his condition had 
deteriorated. He contacted the Industrial Commission and was informed that he 
would need a change of doctor to receive medical treatment in Arizona. After 
the applicant went the rounds with the Industrial Commission, he finally 
decided to come to Salt Lake himself, and see Dr. Lamb rather than undergo any 
further delays in receiving the necessary authorization to see Dr. Eskay in 
Arizona. The applicant saw Dr. Lamb on March 26, 1988, and at that time 
received a CT scan at Western Neurological Associates. Dr. Lamb ruled out 
further surgery, gave the applicant pain medication, and told hia he would 
need an EHG from Dr. Thoen. The applicant returned home and a week later came 
back to Salt Lake City and received the nerve conduction study from Dr. 
Thoen. At that time, the applicant was informed by his adjustor that they 
would require a second opinion following Dr. Lamb's examination, and that the 
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appl icant should take a l l of h i s x-rays home with hia* The applicant was a lso 
placed on temporary t o t a l compensation benefits commencing e f fect ive March 26, 
1988. Dr. Lamb, upon hearing that an IMS would be performed, informed Hr. 
Come LI that no further treatment would be provided u n t i l the independent 
medical examination had been accomplished. 
On May 23, 1988, the applicant was s^n by Dr. Rand for the 
independent medical examination. He informed Dr. Rand that he had been 
keeping a low prof i l e with respect to h is a c t i v i t i e s , and that as the result 
he f e l t b e t t e r . Dr. Rand informed the applicant that he was releasing hia for 
l i g h t duty and that he should increase his a c t i v i t i e s as he could tolerate 
them. The applicant tried riding a three-wheeled vehicle to move some 
spr ink ler s on a fr iend's ranch, and was only able to do that for three days 
without having further problems. He returned to Dr. Rand one month later, and 
reports that he was in worse shape that he had been in i n i t i a l l y . Dr. Rand 
then informed the applicant that he would need a myelogram to rule out the 
need for surgery . At this point , the applicant t e s t i f i e d that he informed the 
doctor that Dr. Lamb had already had a CT scan performed and had rjied out 
surgery p r e v i o u s l y . Dr. Rand informed that the applicant that he would s t i l l 
n^d an enhanced CT scan and a myelogram which might show some problem not 
i d e n t i f i a b l e on a regular CT scan. 
The applicant was hospi ta l ized at the John C. Lincoln Hospital in 
Phoenix, Arizona for the period July 28 through July 30, 1988. Dr. Rand 
informed the applicant that he could find nothing wrong with his back and that 
he did not understand what the applicant's problem was. He instructed the 
appl icant to return in five days to h i s . o f f i ce . The applicant did so, and on 
August 4 , 1988, the doctor reaffirmed that the myelogram was negative and that 
the app l i cant should return home and report back to the doctor in one month 
for further fo l low up. The applicant contacted his adjustor and complained 
about Dr. Rand and requested permission to see another doctor. The adjustor 
informed the applicant that she was in the process of having his case 
evaluated by the Arizona' Rehabil i tat ion Department, and was considering a 
permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y dependent, of course, upon the rehabilitation 
report . 
She further informed the applicant that he should keep h i s 
appointment w i th Dr. Rand. The applicant returned to Dr. Rand on December 15, 
1988, and a t that time the doctor informed the applicant that he did not have 
anything wrong with h i s back, but the applicant took issue with this finding 
i n d i c a t i n g to the doctor that Dr. Lamb had already ident i f ied a bulging disc 
a t L3-4 and that the disc was impigning on the applicant's nerve root. The 
appl icant t e s t i f i e d that he questioned the quality of the doctor1 s x-ray 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and the doctor apparently took embridge with that challenge. 
The app l i cant l e f t the doctor's o f f i c e on less than amicable terms. 
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The appl icant , upon arriving homaf indicated that he was rather 
heated and contacted the ad jus tor and informed what had happened. She 
informed him that she was sympathetic and that she was s t i l l waiting to 
schedule him with the Arizona Sehabilitation Department. However, she further 
informed the applicant that he was not authorized to return to Or, Lamb. On 
September 29 , 1988, the defendant's wrote the applicant a Letter informing h i s 
that pursuant to the report of Dr. Sand no further benefits would be due as 
tha r e s u l t of the industrial accident of January 30, 1984. Dr. Sand concluded 
that tha a p p l i c a n t ' s problems were not a result of his industrial accident of 
January 30 , 1984. Thereafter, the applicant had no further medical treatment 
u n t i l ha saw Dr. Dowiing on January 27, 1989. Dr. Dowiing has recommended 
that tha appl icant continue to receive conservative care from Dr. Lamb. 
Tha appl icant 's f i r s t back injury occurred in 1968, when he was 
c u t t i n g l o s s in Arizona. At that time the applicant had just completed the 
f e l l i n g of a large pine tree, and as that tree f e l l to the ground i t 
apparently dis lodged a dead aspen tree. As a result , that tree f e l l as the 
app l i cant was "bucking" branches from the pine tree. The applicant testif ied 
that he was bant over and as he was removing those limbs, the large dead aspen 
f a l l across h i s back. The applicant eventually received a fusion from 14-31 
by Dr. Peterson at the Southside District Hospital in Heza, Arizona. When tha 
appl icant moved in January of 1988, he was driving a pick up truck, which 
contained boxes of small odds and mds but no furniture. 
With the f i l e in this posture, the case was returned to the medical 
panel to determine i f there had been any change in the applicant's prior 
rat ing of 17.5% of tha whole ^vson due. to the industrial accident of January 
30 , 1984. 
Tha panel found that the applicant has not been temporarily totally 
d i sab led as a resu l t of the industrial accident of January 30, 1984, beyond 
Saptembar 1 2 , 1988. The panel also found that the permanent impairment due to 
tha i n d u s t r i a l accident of Jzxuizcj 30, 1984, has not increased beyond the 
17.5% of tha whole person previously awarded. The panel also found that there 
has bean no increase in the pre-existing lumbar impairment rating of 17.5%. 
F i n a l l y , tha panel concluded that future medical care as a result of the 
i n d u s t r i a l accident of January 30, 1984, should include reasonable access to 
p e r i o d i c orthopedic care. Tha panel concluded that tha "applicant should have 
fur ther i n s t r u c t i o n in back care and periodic advise as to management of his 
back problem from someone l ike Dr. Dowiing or her associates who are near 
anough to him both physically and psychologically to be helpful." Tha 
Adminis trat ive Law Judge adopts tha findings of tha medical panel as his own. 
Pursuant to the findings of tha medical panelf tha applicant is not 
e n t i t l e d t o any further benefits as the result of the industrial accident of 
January 30 , 1984, at this time. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that tha claim of L.B. Cornell for additional 
temporary to ta l compensation and permanent partial impairment benefits as tha 
rasult of tha indixstrial accident of January 30, 1984, should be, and the same 
i s hereby dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Hot ion for Review of the foregoing 
shal l be f i l e d in writing within thirty (30) days of the data hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
f i l e d , th i s Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Passed by tha Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Laka<City, Utah, this 
S^^J day of flepteabeg, 1989. 
ATTEST: 
Patr ic ia 0. Aahby —' / 
Commission Secretary 
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I cert i fy that on £ £ ^ i u c _ J 2 _ f W a copy of tha attachad 
ORDSH i n tha casa of L.B. Cornell issuad Tinligiim.L . ? was mailed to tha 
f o l i o wins parsons at tha following addresses, pos^^Tpaid: 
L.B. Cornell 
P.O. Box 1944 
Snowflaka, Ax 85937 
Henry X. Chai 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 45000 
S a l t Lake City, Utah 4145 
Rational Farmers Union 
5284 South 320 Wast #C144 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84147 
Employers Reinsurance Fund 
THE DTOUSTHIAL CCMMISSXOS OF UTAH 
By rfhKkij $!t£k 
Sherry Smith 
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"Contradictory testimony alone is not suffi-
cient to disturb a jury verdict To overturn 
a verdict on appeal for insufficiency of 
evidence, this Court must find that reason-
able minds must necessarily entertain a 
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt" 
State v. Watts, Utah, 675 P.2d 566, 568 
(1983); State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 
444 (1983). It is not our function to deter-
mine the credibility of conflicting evidence 
or the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom. Watts, supra. 
[2] We find the record to contain suffi-
cient evidence to identify, beyond a reason-
able doubt Bagiey as the burglar and geta-
way driver at the Rainbo .station. Smith's 
inability to immediately identify Bagiey at 
the police station can be reasonably ex-
plained by his lack of sleep at the time. 
Most importantly, his momentary lapse 
does not diminish the accuracy of his prior 
identifications. Minutes after the burglary 
Smith identified the getaway truck at the 
scene of the accident The truck was sub-
sequently determined to belong to Bagiey. 
At the accident scene Smith also identified 
the person whose photograph appeared on 
Bagiey's driver's license as the burglar. 
Only two hours later he did so again. 
Furthermore, Bagle/s own claim that 
his truck had been stolen was refuted by 
Detective Bnnghurst's testimony. Brin-
ghurst testified that Bagiey told him that 
at night he always left his wallet and one 
set of keys in his truck and in the morning 
used his spare key to get back in. How-
ever, at the seen/of the. accident the police 
found two ignition keys to the truck on its 
front seat When Bagley's girlfriend at-
tempted to retrieve the truck from the im-
pound lot she confirmed that these two 
were the only keys to it Thus, even if 
Bagiey'3 account of his parking practices 
had been believed by the trial judge, the 
presence at the scene of the accident of the 
only two keys to the truck, including the 
spare key that Bagiey stated he kept in his 
possession, was highly persuasive in plac-
ing Bagiey at the scene and refuting his 
claim that his truck had been stolen. Fur-
thermore, the alibi evidence offered by 
Bagiey and several of his friends was 
vague, self-contradictory and unconvincing. 
We hold that there was sufficient evidence 
to convict Bagiey of burglary, theft and 
filing a false report 
[3] Bagiey also attempts to argue that 
Smith's in-court identification of him as the 
burglar was the result of what he charac-
terizes as the "suggestive" prior encounter 
in Bringhurst's office and thus should have 
been inadmissible. Bagiey, however, failed 
to object to Smith's identification either 
before or during trial. We therefore will 
not review this claim. Utah R.Evid. 
103<aXl); State *. Malmrose, Utah, 649 
P.2d 56, 58 (1982). 
Affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., and OAKS, STEWART and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
ALVIN G. RHODES PUMP SALES and 
State Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and Second Injury Fund, Defendants. 
No. 19163. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 26, 1984. 
In workmen's compensation case. State 
Insurance Fund sought reimbursement 
from the Second Injury Fund for medical 
and disability payments that State Insur-
ance Fund made pursuant to a settlement 
with an injured employee of the insured. 
An administrative law judge refused to or-
der reimbursement and the Industrial Com-
mission denied a petition for review. State 
Insurance Fund and its insured brought 
original proceeding for judicial review. 
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Cite a* 6tl ?2d 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that 
State Insurance Fund was entitled to ap-
portionment between it and the Second In-
jury Fund of medical expenses, temporary 
total disability, and permanent partial dis-
ability payments paid to injured employee, 
even though the payments were made pur-
suant to a settlement to which the Second 
Injury Fund was not a party. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hall, CJ., filed concurring and dissent-
ing opinion. 
Howe, J., filed concurring and dissent-
ing opinion. 
L Workers' Compensation <fc»1030 
Second Injury Fund may be liable for a 
part of a workmen's compensation settle-
ment negotiated between an employee and 
the employer or its insurance carrier, when 
the employee, the employer, and its insur-
ance earner did not know at tune of settle-
ment that the Fund was liable. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-69. 
2. Compromise and Settlement e^l 
The law generally encourages settle-
ments. 
3. Workers' Compensation <^ »1030 
The Second Injury Fund can be held 
liable for its statutory liabilities in a work-
men's compensation case even after the 
completion of a hearing to which it is not a 
party and the Fund is not insulated from 
its liabilities because circumstances giving 
rise to those liabilities were not foreseen. 
4. Workers' Compensation-^» 1030 
Intricate statutory pattern governing 
liabilities of the Second Injury Fund to 
workmen's compensation insurance carri-
ers should be accorded due protection by 
procedural law, which must assure fairness 
to the Fund and also give effect to the 
basic statutory scheme for allocating liabili-
ty for the payment of compensation, re-
gardless of whether liability of the Fund is 
made pursuant to settlement or pursuant 
to an award made after a full dress hear-
ing. U.OA.1953, 35-1-69. 
ES v. INDUSTRIAL COftTN Utah 1245 
1244 (UtaJl 1984) 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=»669 
Questions not raised in an administra-
tive tribunal are not subject to judicial re-
view except in exceptional cases. 
6. Workers' Compensation «»1030.1(7) 
Second Injury Fund was precluded 
from arguing to the Supreme Court that no 
workmen's compensation should be allowed 
for portion of employee's back injury found 
by a medical panel to be due to his chronic 
alcoholism, where the Fund raised the issue 
for first time in its respondent's brief with-
out having cross-petitioned for review of 
the Industrial Commission decision, in its 
answer to State Insurance Fund's motion 
to review the order of the administrative 
law judge before the Industrial Commis-
sion, the Second Injury Fund neither dis-
puted the award nor filed its own motion 
for review, and no circumstances of injus-
tice compelled review of the issue. 
7. Workers' Compensation a=»1030.1(l), 
1057 
State Insurance Fund was entitled to 
an apportionment between it and the Sec-
ond Injury Fund of medical expenses, tem-
porary total disability, and permanent par-
tial disability payments State Insurance 
Fund had paid to injured employee, even 
though the payments had been made pur-
suant to a settlement to which the Second 
Injury Fund had not been a party, where 
employee's preexisting back condition was 
latent and did not manifest itself until after 
the settlement, none of the settling parties 
knew of the prior condition, and Second 
Injury Fund was notified of its potential 
liability arising out of the settlement at 
earliest possible date. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-
69. 
James D. Black, Salt Lake City, Stephen 
W. Julien, Cedar City, for plaintiffs. 
Gilbert Martinez, Admin. Second Injury, 
Frank Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Ind. 
Coram.), Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
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STEWART, Justice: 
In this workmen's compensation case, 
the State Insurance Fund ("State Insur-
ance") seeks reimbursement from the Sec-
ond Injury Fund ("the Fund") for medical 
and disability payments that State Insur-
ance made pursuant to a settlement with 
an injured employee of the insured. An 
administrative law judge refused to order 
reimbursement. The Industrial Commis-
sion denied a petition for review. We re-
verse and remand. 
The administrative law judge found the 
following facts. Wilbur G. Rhodes was an 
employee of Rhodes Pump Sales. On two 
separate occasions, once on August 15, 
1977, and later on May 1, 1978, he injured 
his back lifting heavy objects at work. 
Back problems and medical treatment en-
sued, causing Rhodes to miss several days 
of work, and causing a permanent back 
impairment State Insurance paid for Mr. 
Rhodes' medical treatment and missed days 
of work as those expenses were incurred. 
On approximately July 23, 1980, Mr. 
Rhodes signed a written settlement with 
State Insurance, in which he (1) accepted 
the payments to that date as payment in 
full for the medical and temporary disabili-
ty benefits due him, and (2) agreed to ac-
cept $6,676.80 as a settlement for his per-
manent partial impairment Based on a 
medical report the settlement agreement 
set the level of permanent partial impair-
ment of Rhodes' back at 20%. At that 
time, no party knew that Rhodes had any 
pre-existing back conditions. Apparently 
for this reason, the Second Injury Fund 
was not a party to the settlement 
In 1981, Mr. Rhodes filed an application 
for an adjustment of his prior claim. He 
alleged that his back had deteriorated since 
the medical treatment was completed and 
thus sought an increased permanent partial 
impairment rating. He named Rhodes 
Pump Sales, the State Insurance Fund, and 
the Second Injury Fund as defendants. 
As required by statute, U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-1-69, the case was submitted to a 
medical panel for a medical examination. 
The panel found that Mr. Rhodes' back had 
not deteriorated from the 20% impairment 
level previously determined. The panel al-
located the causes of his impairment as 
follows: 
(1) Five percent for the May 1978 injury; 
(2) Five percent for the August 1977 in-
jury; and 
(3) Ten percent for "previously-existing 
conditions" due to "degenerative ar-
thritis and disk disease of the low 
back." 
The finding as to the pre-existing condi-
tions arguably made the Fund liable for 
part of the previously paid medical and 
disability benefits. § 35-1-69. 
In addition, the medical panel also found 
that Rhodes had a pre-existing 5% neuro-
logical impairment known as "sensory po-
lyneuropathy," which was caused by chron-
ic alcoholism that Rhodes had suffered pri-
or to the industrial injuries. Based on 
these separate whole man impairment rat-
ings, the medical panel arrived at a com-
bined partial man impairment rating of 
24%. See generally Jacobsen Construc-
tion v. Hair, Utah, 667 P.2d 25 (1983). 
The administrative law judge initially de-
nied Mr. Rhodes' request that his perma-
nent impairment rating be increased. The 
judge reasoned that although the new im-
pairment rating of 24% was 4% greater 
than the 20% rating agreed on in the settle-
ment the 4% increase was due to a condi-
tion (chronic alcoholism) which had existed 
at the time of the 1980 settlement Thus, 
the judge held that Rhodes was not entitled 
to any additional benefits. The judge also 
refused to order the Fund to reimburse 
State Insurance for medical expenses, tem-
porary total disability payments, or perma-
nent partial disability payments. 
Mr. Rhodes and the plaintiffs contested 
the order. Rhodes asserted that he was 
entitled to a 4% disability rating increase; 
the plaintiffs asserted that they were enti-
tled to reimbursement from the Fund 
for l5/a of the medical and temporary total 
benefits they had paid to Rhodes and 
for l%o of the permanent partial disability 
that they had paid. After negotiations be-
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the judge signed an partial impairment payments had been paid tween the parties 
amended order that (1) increased Mr. 
Rhodes' permanent partial impairment rat-
ing by 4%; (2) ordered the Fund to pay Mr. 
Rhodes $1,335.36 for the i% increase; and 
(3) ordered the Fund to reimburse State 
Insurance for only 4/24 of the temporary 
total disability and medical expenses it had 
paid. 
Plaintiffs then filed a petition for review 
with the Industrial Commission. In deny-
ing the petition, the Commission referred 
to the above facts and stated: 'The parties 
to the 1980 compensation agreement are 
bound by the terms of that document and 
no further changes in the apportionment 
should be permitted." 
On appeal to this Court, State Insurance 
argues that the Fund is required by § 35-
1-69(1) to reimburse State Insurance. 
That section defines the scope of the 
Fund's responsibility: 
If any employee who has previously 
incurred a permanent incapacity by acci-
dental injury, disease, or congenital caus-
es, sustains an industrial injury for 
which compensation and medical care is 
provided by this title that results in per-
manent incapacity which is substantially 
greater than he would have incurred if 
he had not had the pre-existing incapaci-
ty, [then] compensation and medical care 
. . . shall be awarded on the basis of the 
combined injuries, but the liability of 
the employer for such compensation 
and medical care shall be for the indus-
trial injury only and the remainder 
shall be paid out of the [second injury 
fund] [Emphasis added.]l 
The Fund does not contend that the set-
tlement amounts paid for medical expenses, 
temporary total disability or permanent 
partial impairment were excessive, nor 
does it contend that the findings of 10% 
impairment due to the prior disk disease 
and 5% impairment due to alcoholism were 
in error. Clearly, if the medical expenses, 
temporary total disability and permanent 
by State Insurance pursuant to an adjudi-
cated award, § 35-1-69(1) would require 
the Fund to reimburse State Insurance for 
a portion of those expenses. U.S. Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, Utah, 657 P.2d 764 (1983); Inter-
mountain Smelting Corp, v. Capitano, 
Utah, 610 P.2d 334 (1980); White v. Indus-
trial Commission, Utah, 604 P.2d 478 
(1979). 
The Fund argues that: (1) § 35-1-69(1) 
applies only to adjudicated awards, not to 
settlements, and (2) even if that section 
applies to settlements, it does not require 
the Fund to reimburse an employer for 
settlements to which the Fund was not a 
party. 
The Fund relies on Pacheco v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 668 P.2d 553 (1983). 
The issue in Pacheco was whether the pro-
vision in § 35-1-78, which requires com-
pensation awards made by the Industrial 
Commission to include interest, applies to 
settlements as well as to awards. We held 
that § 35-1-78 did not apply to settle-
ments, stating: 
Unlike an award, a settlement involves 
no factual determination by the Commis-
sion of liability or the amount of dam-
ages. In view of this distinction, we 
cannot presume that the Legislature in-
tended the interest provision to apply to 
settlements. 
Id. at 555. 
The present case is distinguishable from 
Pacheco. The settlement in Pacheco con-
cerned only the employee and the employer 
or its insurer. Our ruling that § 35-1-78 
does not require the Commission to award 
interest on a settlement was consistent 
with an employee's being free to bargain 
for interest on the settlement amount 
[1] In contrast to Pacheco, the Second 
Injury Fund may be liable for a part of a 
settlement negotiated between an employee 
and the employer or its insurance carrier, 
1. This subsection has since been amended, but (Supp.1983). 
is stiil substantially the same. See § 35-1-69 
- 38 - Addendum 8 
1248 U t a h 681 PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES 
when the employee, the employer, and its 
insurance carrier did not know that the 
Fund was liable. In this case, for example, 
the pre-existing condition was not known 
until after the settlement Under such con-
ditions, good reason exists to apply § 35-1-
69(1) to settlements. 
[2] The law generally encourages set-
tlements. Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Travelstead, Utah, 592 P.2d 605, 607 
(1979); Reynolds v. Merrill 23 Utah 2d 
155, 460 P.2d 323 (1969). If we were to 
rule, as the Fund requests, that § 35-1-
69(1) does not apply to settlements, then 
insurance companies and employers might 
be deterred from settling any case in which 
reimbursement from the Fund might be an 
issue. 
The Fund's back-up argument is that 
even if § 35-1-69(1) does apply to settle-
ments, it applies only to settlements to 
which th* Fund is a, pwty. 
[3] An insurance carrier cannot always 
know at the outset of a workmen's compen-
sation case whether the Fund's interests 
are or might be involved. In Paoli v. Cot-
tonwood Hospital Utah, 656 P.2d 420 
(1982), we held that if the Fund failed to 
receive proper notice in a workmen's com-
pensation case, then it could, "where neces-
sary, compel the reopening of [a] hearing 
to allow the Fund to submit evidence bear-
ing upon its special interest and liability." 
Id. at 423. Thus, the Fund could be held 
liable for its statutory liabilities even after 
the completion of a hearing. The Fund is 
not insulated from its liabilities because the 
circumstances giving rise to those liabilities 
were not foreseen. In Paoli the Court 
stated: 
The circumstances that alert the par-
ties . . . to a potential payment from the 
Second Injury Fund are, of course, ex-
ceptional, and sometimes will not appear 
until the proceedings are underway. It 
is therefore inexpedient to require the 
Fund to be a participant or even a party 
in every proceeding before the Commis-
sion, and the statutes do not require this. 
. . . [T]he Second Injury Fund need not 
be a party to every workmen's compensa-
tion proceeding that may ultimately af-
fect its interests. 
656 P.2d at 422, 423. 
[4 J The fundamental policy underlying 
Paoli is that the intricate statutory pattern 
governing the liabilities of the Fund to 
insurance carriers should be accorded due 
protection by the procedural law, which 
must assure fairness to the Fund and also 
give effect to the basic statutory scheme 
for allocating liability for the payment of 
compensation. These principles control the 
liability of the Fund as much when a com-
pensation payment is made pursuant to set-
tlement as when an award is made after a 
full dress hearing is conducted. 
In the instant case, Mr. Rhodes' pre-ex-
isting back condition was latent and did not 
manifest itself until after the settlement. 
The record indicates that none of the set-
tling parties knew of the prior condition. 
The medical report upon which the settling 
parties relied stated that except for some 
prior unrelated treatment in a V.A. hospi-
tal, Rhodes' "past history is not otherwise 
significant." The Industrial Commission 
stated in its denial of the motion for review 
that at the time of the settlement, 4*[p]re-
existing conditions were not indicated as a 
part of the 20% permanent partial impair-
ment." 
The Fund was notified at the earliest 
possible date of its potential liability aris-
ing out of the settlement. The earliest 
time the parties knew or even suspected 
the existence of the pre-existing condition 
was when Mr. Rhodes applied for an in-
crease in permanent partial disability. 
Our ruling in this case is consistent with 
the position taken by other states. Ameri-
can Standard, Inc. v. Stephen, Ky.App.. 
565 S.W.2d 158 (1978), held that a failure to 
include Kentucky's "Special Fund" as a 
party to a settlement did not preclude join-
ing it in a later action for increased bene-
fits. As here, the employee did not know 
of a pre-existing condition until after the 
settlement. The court noted that the Spe-
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cial Fund had been notified as soon as 
possible, stating: 
Once the employee discovered the true 
nature and extent of his disability, he 
sought to make the Special Fund a party 
at his first opportunity to do so. 
Under these circumstances, where 
there was no evidence that either party 
withheld any information from the oth-
erf,} . . . we find that the board correctly 
reopened the award, made the Special 
Fund a party, and apportioned the 
award. 
Id. at 162. 
In Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. 
Alterman Foods, Inc., 162 Ga.App. 428, 
291 S.E.2d 758 (1982), an employee settled 
with the employer and later received an 
additional award from an administrative 
law judge. The employer sought reim-
bursement from the Georgia counterpart to 
Utah's Second Injury Fund of all amounts 
(apparently including the settlement) paid 
after the injury had occurred. The Georgia 
second injury fund sought to avoid liability 
on the grounds that the prior proceedings 
between the employee and the employer 
were conclusive of the employer's right to 
reimbursement The Georgia appellate 
court ruled that although the employer had 
not sought reimbursement in the prior pro-
ceeding, it had the right to do so now. See 
also Arduser v. Daniel International 
Corp., 7 Kan.App.2d 225, 640 P.2d 329 
(1982) (special fund required to reimburse 
insurer for an entire settlement). But see 
Yocom v. Jordan Auto Parts Co., Ky„ 521 
S.W.2d 519 (19T5) (reimbursement denied). 
See generally 2 A. Larson, The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation § 59.31(f) 
(1982). 
We emphasize that in this case the em-
ployee, not the insurance carrier, sought to 
reopen the case after settlement There-
fore, this case does not necessarily mean 
that an insurance carrier may seek reim-
bursement after settlement, unless the em-
ployee reopens the case to obtain additional 
compensation for the same injury that was 
the subject matter of the settlement 
681 P 22-28 
ES v. INDUSTRIAL COftTN Utah 1249 
1244 (Utah 1994) 
The Fund contends that no compensation 
should be allowed Mr. Rhodes for his 
chronic alcoholism. In effect, the Fund 
requests affirmative relief by seeking a 
reversal of the \7* increase in the perma-
nent partial disability rating. The Fund 
raises this issue for the first time in its 
respondent's brief without having cross-pe-
titioned for review. Moreover, the Fund 
failed to raise the issue before the Commis-
sion. In the Fund's answer to State Insur-
ance's motion to review the order of the 
administrative law judge before the Com-
mission, the Fund neither disputed the 4% 
increase nor filed its own motion for re-
view. Instead, the Fund in fact accepted 
the increase by taking the position that the 
"responsibility of the Second Injury Fund 
for reimbursement should be Y24 . . . of any 
medical expenses paid." 
[5,6] Ordinarily questions not raised in 
an administrative tribunal are not subject 
to judicial review. E.g., Waikiki Resort 
Hotel, Inc. v. City and County of Honolu-
lu, 63 Haw. 222, 624 P.2d 1353 (1981); 
Leschi Improvement Council v. Wash-
ington State Highway Commission, 84 
Wash.2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974); 2 Am. 
Jur.2d Administrative Law § 724 (1962); 
73A CJ.S. Public Administrative Law 
and Procedure § 191 (1983). Even though 
that rule may not be applied in exceptional 
cases, see cases cited at 73A CJ.S. Public 
Administrative Law and Procedure § 191 
n. 93 (1983), this is not such a case. The 
Fund had full opportunity to raise the issue 
of chronic alcoholism and failed to do so at 
two critical junctions. No circumstances of 
injustice compel review of the issue on 
appeal. In declining to address the issue 
on procedural grounds, we do not express 
any view whatsoever on the merits of the 
issue. 
[7] In light of the above, we hold that 
State Insurance is entitled to have an ap-
portionment between it and the Fund of the 
medical expenses, temporary total disabili-
ty, and permanent partial disability pay-
ments it has paid to Mr. Rhodes. On re-
mand, these payments should be appor-
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tioned in the customary way as required by 
§ 35-1-69. 
Reversed and remanded. 
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice (Concurring and 
Dissenting;): 
I join the opinion of the Court, except the 
portion thereof that declines to address the 
contention of the Fund that no compensa-
tion shall be allowed Rhodes for his condi-
tion of chronic alcoholism. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Fund 
did not seek reversal of that portion of the 
award based upon chronic alcoholism, as a 
matter of law, Rhodes is not entitled to 
such an award. 
This Court should exercise its preroga-
tive to correct this obvious error in the 
application of the law and should, upon 
remand, order the reversal of the 4% in-
crease in. the permanent partial disability 
rating attributable to alcoholism. 
HOWE, Justice (Concurring and Dissent-
ing): 
I dissent from that part of the majority 
opinion which requires the Second Injury 
Fund to reimburse the State Insurance 
Fund for part of the monies paid out by it 
under the settlement agreement of July 23, 
1980. I agree that after Rhodes re-opened 
his claim and the medical panel found that 
part of his impairment was due to pre-exist-
ing conditions, the Second Injury Fund 
should bear its proper proportion of com-
pensation thereafter payable to Rhodes. 
The Second Injury Fund was not a party 
to the settlement agreement which was 
entered into by Rhodes and the State Insur-
ance Fund upon competent medical evi-
dence then before them. I think it unfair 
and unsupported by the law that the Sec-
ond Injury Fund can now be made to bear 
part of past payments since it did not par-
ticipate in the making of the agreement 
and there was no medical evidence then 
available that it had any liability. 
The cases cited by the majority in sup-
port of its position do not appear to me to 
be authority that reimbursement should be 
ordered under these circumstances. I have 
no quarrel with American Standard Inc. 
v. Stephen, Ky.App., 565 S.W„2d 158 (1978) 
which permitted the Kentucky Special 
Fund to be joined in a re-opened claim for 
increased benefits. But there the Special 
Fund was not ordered to bear any part of 
the benefits already paid under the pnor 
settlement to which it had noc been a party. 
Likewise, in Subsequent Injury Trust 
Fund v. Alterman Foods, 162 Ga^\pp. 
428, 291 S.E.2d 758 (1982) it does not ap-
pear that the Subsequent Injury Fund was 
required to reimburse the employer for any 
funds it had paid out pursuant to a settle-
ment to which it had not been a party. 
The case holds that reimbursement could 
be sought against the Subsequent Injury 
Fund for monies paid out pursuant to an 
award but by statute the Fund was pro-
tected from the res judicata effect of the 
award to which it had not been a party. In 
Arduser v. Daniel International Corp., 7 
Kan.App.2d 225, 640 P.2d 329 (1982) it ap-
pears in the statement of facts that the 
Kansas Workmen's Compensation Fund 
was required to reimburse the employer 
and its insurance carrier for certain 
amounts but the question of reimburse-
ment was not an issue in the case and is 
not discussed in the court's opinion. 
I do not agree with the majority that 
denying reimbursement will discourage set-
tlements. The settling parties are well pro-
tected since any of them may, as here. 
re-open the claim when new medical evi-
dence is found. The Second Injury Fund 
may then be brought in and made u> bear 
its proportion of future payments. 
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Respondent. 
Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson (On Law and Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on the motion of 
respondents Galigher Ash, Baker International/ and Aetna 
Casualty and Surety (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Galigher Ash*) and on the court's own motion for summary 
affirmance both on the basis that the appeal presents no 
substantial question for consideration. This case is also 
before the court on petitioner's motion for summary reversal. 
We affirm the order of the Board of Review ("Board")/ and 
dismiss the petition. R. Utah Ct. App. 10(a)(2). 
Petitioner Merrill J. Bailey initially applied for 
worker's compensation on or about August 4, 1986. A hearing on 
the claim took place on November 13/ 1986. At that hearing, 
Bailey claimed oil had been spilled in the vicinity of the 
hydraulic press he was operating on June 28/ 1982/ and he 
slipped in the oil and fell/ striking his buttocks on some 
pipes. The employer's first report of injury indicated that an 
accident occurred on June 30/ 1982 while Bailey was turning a 
12" vac impeller over# and that he sustained a strain to his 
back. Petitioner was treated by Dr. Norman Shore following the 
injury. Dr. Shore's office notes indicated that he saw Bailey 
on July 3/ 1982/ and his complaint was "low back strain 
6-29-82/ 10:00 a.m. while lifting heavy machinery." The 
medical records also indicated that as treatment for a 
lumbrosacral strain# Bailey was given a lumbrosacral brace and 
muscle relaxants. The results of a lumbrosacral x-ray were 
negative. Bailey was paid temporary total compensation and 
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returned to work on August 17, 1982, based on his doctor's 
release. Bailey contended at the November 1986 hearing that 
both the employer's report of injury and Dr. Shore's medical 
records 'were incorrect in describing the June 1982 accident as 
a; lifting'accident. Evidence presented at the hearing also 
ibdicat2d^that Bailey slipped and fell on oil in the vicinity 
of his1 piess on December 5, 1977. Bailey maintained, however, 
that the'Injury described as occurring on December 5, 1977 
actually'occurred on June 30, 1982. 
Ba-ilcy continued to work for Galigher Ash from August of 
J.982 un-til October of 1983 when he was laid off. In August of 
JUJS5, lie* sought medical treatment for problems with his legs 
a.nd back, and it was discovered that Bailey had a syrinx on his 
s;?ine. 'In December 1985, he underwent surgery to place a shunt 
in his back for the purpose of draining fluid off his spinal 
column. As of August 6, 1985, Bailey was found to be 
permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration. 
In a decision dated November 21, 1986, the administrative 
law judge found, in relevant part: 
Having had the opportunity to observe the 
demeanor of the applicant and his witness, 
and considering the employer's first report 
and the report of Dr. Shore, I can only 
conclude that the applicant is not telling 
the truth with respect to the events of June 
30, 1982. Therefore, I conclude that he 
sustained an injury on June 30, 1982 but 
that injury was a back strain as diagnosed 
by Dr. Norman Shore, and that the 
applicant's injury of June 30, 1982 did not 
consist of a slip and fall. 
The applicant offered voluminous testimonial 
evidence concerning the presence of the 
symptoms he has been having. However, he 
has offered no medical evidence of a causal 
connection between the sprain of June 30, 
1982 from which the applicant fully 
recovered as of August 16, 1982 and the 
applicant's subsequent syrinx, which was 
discovered in late 1985. 
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[T]he Administrative Law Judge can only 
conclude that he sustained a simple back 
s t r a i n on June 30, 1982, from which he 
recovered and was released to return to work 
on August 17, 1982. The applicant then 
worked for over another year, at which time 
he was laid off due to a reduction in 
force . He then co l l ec ted s i x (6) months of 
unemployment benefits in 1984, and also 
worked for approximately three (3) months 
for Bechtel Dri l l ing Corporation. Once his 
syrinx became symptomatic, the applicant had. 
an increase in symptoms, and f ina l ly sought 
medical treatment in August of 1985. There 
being no evidence in the f i l e to support a 
causal connection between a low back sprain 
and a cervical and thoracic syrinx which was 
found some three (3) years l a t e r , I must 
conclude that the applicant has fai led to 
meet his burden of proof. 
F ina l ly , there i s no evidence in the f i l e of 
any permanent impairment due to the 
industr ia l accident of June 30, 1982. 
Based on the foregoing findings of f a c t , the administrative law 
judge concluded that Bailey had f a i l e d to meet his burden of 
proof - e s tab l i sh ing that he i s e n t i t l e d to additional temporary 
t o t a l compensation, medical expenses or permanent impairment as 
a r e s u l t of the industrial accident of June 30, 1982.- The 
Board affirmed and adopted the adminstrative law judge's 
d e c i s i o n on December IS, 1986. Bailey then f i l ed a pet i t ion 
for wr i t of review with this court, but that petit ion was 
d i smissed on March 16, 1987 because i t was not timely f i l ed 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-83. 
On May 9, 1989, Bailey f i l e d another application for 
hearing wi th the Industrial Commission concerning an accident 
occurring on June 30, 1982. This second application described 
the acc ident as a l i f t i n g accident, rather than a s l ip and f a l l 
and sought permanent and to ta l d i s a b i l i t y benefits . Galigher 
Ash f i l e d a motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of res 
j u d i c a t a , which was granted by the administrative law judge on 
Ju ly 28/ 1989 and affirmed by the Board on October 26, 1989. 
The administrat ive law judge concluded that "[a] present claim 
that the syrinx has resulted in permanent total d i sab i l i ty must 
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f a i l where the causal l ink between the injury and the syrinx 
has p r e v i o u s l y been adjudicated." The present p e t i t i o n for 
w r i t of review i s from the 1989 proceedings* 
These proceedings were commenced after January 1, 1988, and 
thus our review i s governed by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) of 
the Ut«Ix-Administrative Procedures Act. Sect ion 
6 3 - 4 6 b - i 6 ( 4 ) (d) provides, in relevant part, that an appel late 
court s n a i l grant r e l i e f where a person seeking review has been 
c u t s t a n t i a i l y prejudiced because "the agency has erroneously 
' i n t e r p r e t e d or applied the law." We must determine i f the 
Commission erred in dismissing the 1989 p e t i t i o n on the bas is 
o:c res j u d i c a t a . 
The d o c t r i n e of res judicata i s avai lable in worker's 
compensation matters . See Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 
§ 79 .72 ( 1 9 8 9 ) . Application of res judicata must, however, be 
harmonized with the continuing j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Industrial 
Commission in workers compensation to reopen cases and modify 
awards. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1988) provides, in relevant 
p a r t , t h a t " [ t ]he powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Commission 
over each case s h a l l be continuing, and i t may from time to 
t ime make such modification or change with respect to formal 
f i n d i n g s , or orders with respect thereto , as in i t s opinion may 
be j u s t i f i e d . - The Utah Supreme Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y 
i n t e r p r e t e d the foregoing language to require "as the basis of 
m o d i f i c a t i o n , evidence of some s i g n i f i c a n t change or new 
development in the claimant's injury or proof of the previous 
award's inadequacy.- Buston v. Industrial Commission. 587 P.2d 
121 , 123 (Utah 1978); £&£ also Soencer v. Industrial 
Commission, 733 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1987) (per curiam). In 
Buxton and Soencer, the Commission's or ig ina l order found a 
s u b s t a n t i a l permanent part ia l d i s a b i l i t y based on a causal 
c o n n e c t i o n between an industrial accident and the claimant's 
i n j u r y . In each case , the Utah Supreme Count held the 
Commission erred by refusing to modify the award based on 
subsequent evidence that the employee was not employable and 
cou ld not be r e h a b i l i t a t e d . These cases are dis t inguishable 
from c a s e s such as the present one where no causal re lat ion 
between the injury and the industrial accident has ever been 
e s t a b l i s h e d . The finding of lack of causation i s res judicata 
i n a subsequent claim for recovery based on the same accident 
and i n j u r y . S££, flj^L-/ Huohev v. Industrial Commission, 394 
N.E.2d 1164 (111. 1979); Reddel v. Industrial Commission, 131 
Ariz App. 263, 640 P.2d 194 (Ariz App. 1982); Govan v. 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 23 Ariz. App. 261, 532 P.2d 533 (Ariz. 
App. 1 9 7 5 ) . 
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In the case now before us, Galigher Ash contends that "the 
prior adjudication in this case involved the same injuries as 
are alleged in this case." Bailey counters that the second 
application differs from the original one because he-uow claims 
a lifting accident rather than a slip and fall and he* 'now 
claims permanent disability. He interprets the administrative 
law judge's 1986 decision as concluding that he had not-
sustained his burden of proving that a slip and fall]occurred 
and states that the 'accident claimed in the May 9, 193S 
application was "the accident and injury that was on the 
records instead of the alleged slip and fall accident*.. This 
case is similar to Houser v. Southern Idaho Pioe & Sb**!. Inc. 
649 P.2d 1197 (Idaho 1982). The claimant in that caca alleged 
a knee injury and in the course of the hearing, contended that', 
he had sustained back injuries on two occasions when Iiis knee 
went out. He appealed from the Industrial Commission's order 
that his condition had stabilized/ resulting in a 10% permanent 
partial impairment. During the pendency of the appeal, 
claimant filed a second complaint alleging an injury to his 
back as a result of the knee injury and seeking additional 
compensation. The employer made a motion to dismiss on the 
basis that the back injury had already been considered. The 
Commission granted the motion and claimant appealed. The Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that "the proceeding in the 
instant case and in the prior proceeding arose out of the same 
operative facts between the same parties" and holding that the 
second application was properly dismissed on the basis of res 
judicata. 
In the present case, Bailey initially contended he slipped 
and fell on June 30, 1982, and disputed the reports by his 
employer and doctor indicating that he was injured in a lifting 
accident, resulting in a back strain from which he fully 
recovered. The administrative law judge concluded that the 
accident was a lifting accident, and further concluded that no 
causal connection had been established between the compensable 
lifting accident and the syrinx. Petitioner presented no 
medical testimony in the 1986 hearing. Instead, petitioner's 
counsel argued that the onset of symptoms after the accident 
was in itself sufficient to establish prima facie causation and 
require submission to a medical panel, which the administrative 
law judge declined to do on the basis that there was no 
conflicting medical evidence. That decision became final with 
the dismissal of the original petition for review by this court. 
Petitioner attached a letter written by his treating 
physician and dated in December 1986 (one month after the 
original hearing) to his 1989 request for hearing. In the 1989 
decision, the administrative law judge noted "for the sake of 
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discussion,- that the letter from claimant*s doctors was not 
sufficient to establish medical causation because it states, in 
part, that - [i] t would be impossible . • • to attribute the 
fall as"co the origin of his syringomyelia."1 Our review of 
the record and the 1986 decision leads us to conclude that any 
cLoira routing to injury from a June 30, 1982 accident has been 
fully adjudicated by the Commission. The claim that the June 
30, 1982"accident caused the syringomyelia is now barred by res 
judicata/'and the Commission did not err in dismissing the 
petition.?r 
We a'ffirra the Board's order and dismiss the petition. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
1. The letter goes on to suggest that "it is possible that Mr. 
Bailey has had a small, asymptomatic syrinx within his spinal 
cord for many years that with repeated heavy lifting and 
straining may have gradually enlarged, eventually producing his 
weakness and spasticity.* Appellant did not make this claim in 
either his 1986 nor his 1989 requests for benefits. 
2. Much of petitioner's argument concerns alleged 
misrepreseantation by his former attorney about the status of 
his first petition for judical review. He contends that his 
attorney led him to believe that his petition was pending when 
it had actually been dismissed as untimely some eighteen months 
earlier. Although we would not condone such conduct, it does 
not support a different result in this case. 
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